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Abstract
Departing from mainstream economics, surveys rst show that individ-
uals do care about fairness in their demand for redistribution. They also
show that the cultural environment in which individuals grow up a¤ects
their preferences about redistribution. Including these two components of
the demand for redistribution, we propose in this article a mechanism of
cultural transmission of the taste for fairness. Consistently with the process
of socialization, the young preferences depend on collective choices through
observation and imitation. Observation during childhood of redistributive
policies far from what is perceived as fair results then in a lower taste for
fairness. As a consequence, the model exhibits a multiplicity of history-
dependent steady states which may account for the huge di¤erence of redis-
tribution observed between Europe and the United States.
Keywords: redistribution, voting behavior, fairness, endogenous prefer-
ences
JEL: H53, D72, D64
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1 Introduction
In mainstream economics individuals are supposed to be driven only by their
self-interest. As a consequence, when studying the redistributive phenom-
enon in democracy, the rst challenge for most economists is to explain why
there is so little redistribution in democracy. Indeed, considering that the
idea of democracy is captured by the majority rule, as the median citizen
is characterized by an income lower than the average, a majority should
support a complete income redistribution to satisfy their self-interest. As
a canonical answer to this issue, Meltzer and Richard (1981) have shown
that selsh people have no interest to support a overly high redistribution,
even if they are poorer than average, because of a tax disincentive e¤ect
that lowers productivity. Their model also implies that we should observe a
positive correlation between redistribution and income inequality. However,
such a correlation is weakly supported by data. While redistribution is sig-
nicantly higher and more progressive in (continental) Europe than in the
United States, their pre-tax income inequality appear similar (see Table 1).
By contrast, Perotti (1996), Moene and Wallerstein (2001), de Mello and
Tiongson (2006) and Iversen and Soskice (2006) support that the empirical
relationship between income inequality and redistribution is the opposite of
the predicted one or is insignicant.
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Countries Pre-tax income
inequality
(GINI)
Public Social
Spendings (%
GDP)
Progressivity
Index
Sweden 0.37 19.8 1.77
France 0.41 18.3 1.73
Germany 0.43 15.5 1.95
UK 0.41 15.2 1.12
US 0.43 10.6 1.31
Table 1. Income inequality (working age population) and social spending
(except Old Age) in 2005 (source: OECD and authors calculation; the
progressivity index gives the decrease in percent of income inequality allowed
by a social spending of 1% of GDP).
In order to improve the canonical models predictions, di¤erent dimen-
sions have been investigated1. From a behavioral perspective, the postulate
that individuals are driven only by their self-interest has been challenged
when studying redistribution (Piketty, 1995, Alesina and Angeletos, 2005,
Lind, 2007). It has been challenged rstly because an impressive number of
experimental studies have pointed out that individuals do not behave self-
ishly in the way supposed in mainstream economics (see Batson, 1991, Fehr
and Schmidt, 2006). It has also been challenged because analysis of survey
data clearly show that people do care about fairness in their demand for re-
distribution (Fong, 2001, Corneo and Grüner, 2002, Alesina and La Ferrara,
2005, Corneo and Fong, 2008, Alesina and Giuliano, 2010). In line with such
ndings, Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) therefore show that beliefs
according to which luck rather than e¤ort determines income2 are strong
1Economic (Bénabou, 2000), political (Roemer 1998, Rodriguez, 2004, Iversen and
Soskice, 2006, Petrova, 2008, Campante, 2010) and behavioral (Bénabou and Ok, 2001,
Bénabou and Tirole, 2006); see Alesina and Angeletos (2004), Lind (2005) and Campante
(2010) for overviews.
2From World Values Survey data, they highlight that 54% of Europeans versus 30% of
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predictors, unlike income inequality, of the national level of redistribution.
As a matter of fact, fairness has a major inuence in shaping redistributive
politics.
If voters care only about the welfare of the population when considering
redistribution, Piketty (1995) showed that international di¤erences in the
level of redistribution (when countries share identical economic fundamen-
tals) can be explained by di¤erent beliefs about social mobility sustained by
an imperfect learning process. Close to the concept of reciprocal altruism,
Lind (2007) considers that voters care about their self-interest, and the wel-
fare of the members of their own group, more than the rest of the population.
In such a context, he shows that both fractionalization and group antago-
nism reduce redistribution. In the spirit of Gilens (1999), he then supports
that the di¤erence of redistribution between Europe and the United States
is sustained by a di¤erence in ethnic fractionalization. In Alesina and An-
geletos (2005), voters also care about both their self-interest and fairness.
In their model, fairness is not dened according to a utilitarian social wel-
fare as in Piketty (1995) and Lind (2007), but according to a deontological
principle (everyone should receive what he deserves) whose relevance is em-
pirically supported in psychology and sociology when considering income
distribution (see Schokkaert, 1998, Forsé and Parodi, 2006). With income
depending on both e¤ort and luck, they show that cultural variability of
the level of redistribution arises as a multiplicity of equilibria resulting from
di¤erent self-fullled beliefs. By expecting low redistribution, Americans in-
vest in their human capital and generate conditions for low redistribution by
reducing the importance of luck in the income determination. Conversely,
by expecting a high redistribution, Europeans invest less in their human
capital and will support a high redistribution later.
Considering Piketty (1995) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Luttmer
Americans believe that luck rather than e¤ort determines income.
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and Singhal (2011) have however expressed reservations about the capacity
of such beliefs to persist over long periods of time and across generations.
They argue indeed that di¤erent beliefs can be sustained over long periods
only if they are embedded in culture. More generally, their empirical nd-
ings, along with those of Guiso et al. (2006), Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln
(2007) and Alesina and Giuliano (2010), support that cultural and politi-
cal environment in which individuals grow up a¤ects their preferences and
beliefs concerning redistribution. On this basis, Bisin and Verdier (2004)
analysed the dynamics of redistribution through a model of cultural trans-
mission of the taste for leisure. Through socialization, they stress that taste
is shaped by observation, imitation and internalization of cultural practices.
In the same line, we propose in this article a model of cultural transmis-
sion of the taste for fairness. Consistently with the process of socialization,
observation during childhood of redistributive policies far from what is per-
ceived as fair results in a lower taste for fairness. Considering that social
spendings is one of the key tool ghting social exclusion, this mechanism
appears consistent with experiments showing that social exclusion results in
a substantial reduction in prosocial behavior (Tracy et al., 2007). Based on
this mechanism, our model then exhibits a multiplicity of history-dependent
steady states which may account for the huge di¤erence of redistribution
observed between Europe and the United States.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present
the model of cultural transmission and we specify the mechanism explaining
the sustained and signicant di¤erence of redistribution observed between
Europe and the United States. In section 3, we then reexamine the im-
pact of inequality on the level of redistribution. In section 4, we generalize
the multiplicity of steady states found in previous sections by considering
family background and the intergenerational transmission of inequality. We
conclude briey in the last section.
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2 The model
The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals whose actions take
place according to the timeline in Figure 1. Each individual lives for two
periods: childhood and adulthood. When adults, they work in order to
maximize their welfare and the consumption of their household. They also
vote over income redistribution. When children, they are educated and so-
cialized, and by this process they internalize the cultural practices which
will inuence their behavior when they become adults. Indeed, as noted
in Alesina and Giuliano (2010), social psychologists3 argue that the cul-
tural environment during youth can leave a permanent mark on individuals,
while after reaching adulthood they are resistant to change. To assess the
cultural component of human behavior, some studies have pointed out the
signicant and persistent di¤erence between immigrant and native behaviors
such as on fertility choices and womens labor supply (Fernández and Fogli,
2006), on savings (Carroll et al., 1994), on trust (Algan and Cahuc, 2010) or
on preferences for redistribution (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011, Alesina and
Giuliano, 2010). Others have used di¤erent history individuals have expe-
rienced as natural experiments (the German reunication for Alesina and
Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; the Great Depression for Malmendier and Nagel,
2011).
Following Piketty (1995), Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Bénabou and
Tirole (2006), we assume that income yit of an adult at date t is determined
conjointly by luck and by e¤ort such as:
yit = eit + "i (1)
where eit denotes e¤ort and "i luck (or bad luck), unknown before the income
distribution and such as E0 ["i] = 0 (see Fig. 1).
3See Roberts and DelVecchio (2000) for an overview.
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Figure 1: Timing of actions
At each period t, income redistribution is characterized by a taxation rate
 t and a at-rate benet gt. Assuming a balanced budget, it follows that
gt =  tyt, where yt is the mean income in t. Considering then an extended
version of the Bolton-Ockenfels model (2000) of distributive preferences with
costly e¤ort, we specify the utility function as follows:
Uit = yit (1   t) +  tyt   e
2
it
2ai
  't 1
2

 f    t
2
(2)
where ai  0 denotes the taste for e¤ort, distributed independently from
luck, 't 1  0 the taste for fairness, and  f the level of redistribution
perceived as fair4. Note that in the standard version of the Bolton-Ockenfels
model, with no e¤ort, the fair level of redistribution would be characterized
4 In Le Garrec (2009), such preferences for fairness has been interpreted as guilt aver-
sion whose importance in shaping individual behaviors has been experimentally shown by
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) in the trust game.
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by  f = 1, i.e. equality of income.
The optimal e¤ort resulting from the maximization of the expected util-
ity E0 [Uit] is then:
eit = ai (1   t) (3)
As redistribution lowers the market return to e¤ort, it reduces the e¤ort. In
addition, as the taste for e¤ort lowers the utility cost of e¤ort, it enhances
the e¤ort. Considering eq. (3), the pre-tax income (1) of an adult in t can
be rewritten as:
yit = ai (1   t) + "i (4)
As the level of e¤ort is reduced by redistribution, obviously the pre-tax
income is also reduced. As a consequence, redistribution reduces not only
the variance of the disposable income, but also the variance of the pre-tax
income.
Considering eq. (4), maximizing utility (2) with respect to the taxation
rate results in the following individual demands for redistribution in t:
 it =
8<:
a ai+'t 1f
2a ai+'t 1
0
if ai  a+ 't 1 f
otherwise
(5)
Individual demands for redistribution as specied in eq. (5) decrease with
personal income and increase with the level of redistribution perceived as
fair. Eq. (5) is then consistent with empirical surveys (Fong, 2001, Corneo
and Grüner, 2002, Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005, Corneo and Fong, 2008,
Alesina and Giuliano, 2010). In addition, at least if  f  12 , eq. (5) is
also consistent with ndings from Luttmer and Singhal (2011) and Alesina
and Giuliano (2010) which stress that culture and socialization when young
determine the demand for redistribution. They indeed show that immi-
grants from high mean-preference redistribution countries continue to sup-
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port higher redistribution in their destination country. From eq. (5), the
mean-preference redistribution is characterized by t 1
f
a+t 1 . If the fair level of
redistribution reects objective features in the economy such as the impor-
tance of luck in the income determination (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005), the
cultural component in the demand for redistribution corresponds in our set-
ting to the taste for fairness 't 1. Assume then that this taste is shaped by
internalization of cultural practices during childhood through the process of
socialization. First, through voting collective choices depend on adult pref-
erences. The young preferences depend then on collective choices through
observation and imitation. Consistently with the process of socialization,
we assume then that observation during childhood of redistributive poli-
cies far from what is perceived as fair results in a lower taste for fairness:
@'t 1
@jf  t 1j < 0. In order to get analytical results, we specify 't 1 as follows:
't 1 =
1
'0 + '1 [
f    t 1]2
, '0  0, '1 > 0 (6)
Note that, contrary to Bisin and Verdier (2001, 2004), the cultural trans-
mision mechanism we underline occurs through observation and imitation
of society at large, not within family. Note also that considering social
spendings as one of the key tool ghting social exclusion, this mechanism
appears consistent with experiments showing that social exclusion results in
a substantial reduction in prosocial behavior (Tracy et al., 2007).
Knowing that  it as dened by eq. (5) is a decreasing function of ai,
assuming standardingly that the distribution of a is skewed to the right,
i.e. amed  a, entails that the tax rate chosen under the majority rule is
specied as:
 t =
a  amed + 't 1 f
2a  amed + 't 1
(7)
Let  s = a amed2a amed be the taxation rate chosen under the majority rule if
individuals were driven only by their self-interest, i.e. if 't 1 = 0, we can
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rewrite (7) as:
 t = t 1
s +
 
1  t 1

 f (8)
where
t 1 =
2a  amed
2a  amed + 't 1
(9)
Any taxation rate chosen under the majority rule is then expressed as a
convex combination of the purely interested and the purely fair taxation
rates.
Proposition 1 Assume that  f    s 
q
4
(2a amed)'1 , it exists '^0  0
so that if '0  '^0 the model exhibits two steady states characterized by
 s < US < EU   f (see Fig 2).
According to Proposition 1, if  f    s 
q
4
(2a amed)'1 and '0  '^0 the
dynamics of redistribution is then history dependent. Consider for exam-
ple the case where '0 = 0. Considering the tax sequence f tgt=1t=0 and
assuming that  f    s 
q
4
(2a amed)'1 , if 0 2

 f   ;  f + , where
 =
f s 
r
(f s)2  4(2a amed)'1
2 , then limt!1 t = 
f , otherwise lim
t!1 t =
1
2

 f +  s  
q
( f    s)2   4(2a amed)'1

. If the initial level of taxation cor-
responds to an institution lower but su¢ ciently close to the fair level, the
taste for fairness transmitted to the young generation increases. When they
become adult the next period, the latter will then support a redistribution
level closer to the fair level. This cultural transmission process ends with the
implementation of high level of redistribution, close to the level perceived
as fair, as the taste for fairness becomes signicantly large. By contrast, if
people are initially socialized in an environment whose practices and insti-
tutions are far from reecting fairness, internalization of the observed norm
you should behave according to your own interest reduces the concern for
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Figure 2: Multiplicity and history dependancy of redistribution when  f  
 s >
q
4
(2a amed)'1 and 0 < '0 < ~'0.
fairness. The process will end with a low redistribution level, though higher
than the selsh one, as the taste for fairness converges towards a low level.
Note that if '0 > '^0, whatever the level of taxation and its distance with the
fair level, the taste for fairness is always low enough so that the only steady
state corresponds to a low income redistribution. By contrast, if '1 is low
enough so that  f    s <
q
4
(2a amed)'1 , any level of taxation corresponds
to a su¢ ciently fair level so that the only steady state reects a high income
redistribution.
3 Motivation and the impact of inequality on re-
distribution
According to the multiplicity of steady states highlighted in Proposition 1,
a negative correlation between income inequality and redistribution appears
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supported, at least if comparing European countries and the United States.
Indeed, with a higher taxation, Europeans are supposed to make less e¤ort
than Americans. Therefore, their di¤erence between mean and median in-
come is lower. However, from a dynamic perspective, the Meltzer-Richard
e¤ect is still observed. Consider indeed an inequality shock characterized by
d > 0. By increasing the di¤erence between mean and median income, the
purely selsh taxation rate  s increases which results in the increase of the
e¤ective taxation rate both in European countries and in the United States.
However, it is important to note that this result holds by assuming that the
inequality shock d has no impact on the tax rate perceived as fair, while
there are good reasons to think it has. Assume in particular that distribu-
tive justice is characterized by the principle each person should receive what
he deserves5, where the deserved or fair income is dened by:
y^it = eit (10)
i.e. the income only related to e¤ort. Following Alesina and Angeletos
(2005), we then specify the engine of fairness perception by:
Ft =
Z
i
f[(1   t) yit +  tyt]  y^itg2 di (11)
where the taxation rate perceived as fair corresponds to the minimization
of Ft: 
f
t = argminFt. As a and " are independently distributed, eq. (4)
allows us to rewrite eq. (11) as (see Appendix B):
Ft
2a
= (1   t)2
 
L+ 2t

(12)
5Forsé et Parodi (2006) show that European countries share an identical hierarchy of
moral principles: rst the guarantee of basic needs, second fairness (merit), and far less
important equality of income. If we admit that basic needs are mostly satised in Europe
and in the United States, fairness is the relevant concept to analyse marginal variations
of the redistribution levels. In addition, Schokkaert (1998) argues that fairness is the
dominant criteria when considering social relationship at an aggregate level.
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where L = 
2
"
2a
, 2" denotes the variance of " which represents the importance
of luck in the income determination (one can think of for example a uniform
distribution where "max = l, and then where 2" = l
2
3 ) and 
2
a denotes
the variance of a. L represents therefore the relative importance of luck
in the income determination. As obvious, the fair tax rate resulting from
minimization of (12) is  f = 1. At rst glance, this result tends to conrm
that inequality shocks d have no impact on the tax rate perceived as
fair. Nevertheless, it raises two issues which cast doubt on the relevance of
such a result. First, being equal to one, such fair level of taxation implies
that the high level of taxation supposed to reect the European system
is unrealistically close to one. Second, this result is closely related to the
standard assumption in economics that individuals respond only to external
rewards. As a consequence, if income is not related to e¤ort, no e¤ort is
made. By contrast, psychologists (see Ryan and Deci, 2000; Gneezy and
Rustichini, 2000; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Bénabou and Tirole, 2002) stress
the importance of intrinsic motivation in making an e¤ort, where intrinsic
motivation represents incentives unrelated (or eventually negatively related)
to external rewards such as income or status. To adress these two points,
assume that e¤ort is specied as:
eit = e
im
it + e
em
it (13)
where eimit and e
em
it are respectively the intrinsically and extrinsically moti-
vated e¤orts. Intrinsic motivation exists directly between a person and an
activity. On one hand, an e¤ort can be said intrinsically motivated if related
to an interesting activity. On the other hand, an e¤ort can be said intrinsi-
cally motivated if it satises any innate psychological need or taste. In both
cases, the reward is the e¤ort itself. In this view, let us consider that the
taste for e¤ort reects the psychological need underlying the intrinsically
motivated e¤ort so that eimit = ai. Assuming then that only the extrinsically
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e¤ort entails a disutility cost as in (2), it follows that eemit = ai (1   t), and
accordingly:
yit = ai (2   t) + "i (14)
With intrinsic motivation, individuals still continue to make di¤erent
levels of e¤ort even if the level of taxation is equal to one. It follows that
Ft
2a
= (1   t)2 L+ 2t (2   t)2 whose minimization results in (see Appendix
B):
 ft = 
f =
8<: 1 
q
1  L2
1
if L  2
otherwise
(15)
As dened by eq. (15), the tax rate perceived as fair then increases with
the relative importance of luck in the income determination: @
f
@L  0. As
the relative importance of luck is dened by L = 
2
"
2a
, it also means that an
increase of the variance of a reduces the relative luck and then @
f
@2a
 0.
If income was determined only by luck, eq. (15) would imply that  f =
1, as in the standard version of the Bolton-Ockenfels model. In addition,
admit that an increase of the variance of a is correlated with an increase
between mean and median income characterized by  = a   amed as in
standard statistical distributions. For example, assume that a is distributed
according to a Log-normal of parameters  = 0 and . It follows that
2a =

e
2   1

e
2
and  = e
2
2   1. In this case L = 2"
(2+)(1+)2
and
any increase of the di¤erence between mean and median income is associated
with a lower relative importance of luck in the income determination and
then with a lower fair level of redistribution. In this conguration, except
that  s = 2(a amed)2a amed , Proposition 1 stays unchanged and it follows that:
Proposition 2 Assuming  f    s 
q
4
(2a amed)'1 and L < 2, '0  0 and
"s  
f s
f+s
are su¢ cient conditions so that d
EU
d < 0 and
dUS
d > 0.
In the European style system, '0  0 entails EU   f . As long as L < 2,
any increase of the di¤erence between mean and median incomes  can be
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associated straightfowardly with a decrease of the relative importance of
luck in the wage determination L which tends to reduce the level of redistri-
bution: d
EU
d < 0. By contrast, in the American style system, as an increase
of  is also associated with a higher selsh level of redistribution, d
s
d > 0,
the outcome is not straightforward. However, as sustained in Proposition 2,
under an unrestrictive condition, the American style system exhibits a size
increased with the di¤erence between mean and median income as in the
Meltzer-Richard model (1981). This result rst emphasizes the di¢ culty in
investigating the empirical relationship between redistribution and income
inequality. From a dynamic perspective, it also strongly suggests that Eu-
rope and the United States should be dissociated in this task. For example,
while most cross-country studies (e.g. Perotti, 1996, Moene and Wallerstein,
2001, de Mello and Tiongson, 2006, Iversen and Soskice, 2006) found a neg-
ative or insignicant relation between redistribution and income inequality,
Meltzer and Richard (1983) found a positive relation when considering only
the United States from a time-series perspective.
4 Family background and the inheritance of in-
equality
So far, we have pointed out, following empirical studies, that if luck is im-
portant in the income determination, individual demands for redistribution
are stronger. More generally, what is stressed in the surveys to characterize
the perceived unfairness of the income distribution and then the individual
demands for redistribution are factors beyond ones control (e.g. Fong, 2001,
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005, Fong et al., 2006, Corneo and Fong, 2008).
Along with luck, there is then also family background. Thereafter, one can
argue that luck as modelized in eq. (1) is an oversimplication of all the
factors beyond ones control. Indeed, as pointed out by Bowles and Gintis
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(2002) and dAddio (2007), earnings are very signicantly tied to the par-
entsearnings6. When considering the income determination characterized
by eq. (1), such a correlation can be obtained by assuming that psycholog-
ical and cognitive skills are genetic inherited traits. However, by showing
that the inherited genetic component of IQ is very weak, Bowles and Gintis
(2002; see also Bisin and Topa, 2003) weaken the basis of such an assump-
tion. By contrast, it strengthens the idea that family background is an
important factor in the income determination which can not be captured by
idiosyncratic shocks. In this line, Bourdieu (1984) asserts in particular that
cultural consumption is of crucial importance when explaining the capacity
of high-income earners to ensure the reproduction of income inequality. On
one hand, by consuming cultural goods, high-income earners shape wealth-
ier class cultural norms which exclude others. On the other hand, by their
cultural practices, they also develop networking activities. Income, cultural
capital and social capital are closely related.
On a family cultural basis of factors beyond ones control, in contrast
with eq. (1), let us consider that income of an adult in t is characterized by:
yij;t = cj;t 1 + eit (16)
where cj;t 1 denotes parentscultural consumption in t 1. Considering the
di¤erent types of consumption goods, we redene the utility function as:
6As noted in Bowles and Gintis (2002), a widely held consensus among American econo-
mists used to be that "Low earnings as well as high earnings are not strongly transmitted
from father to sons" (Becker, 1988). However, following Solon (1992) the low correla-
tions between fathers and sons incomes previously estimated in America were due to
measurement errors. With improved methodology and data, Björklund and Jäntti (1997)
even show that the intergenerational income mobility in Sweden is higher (however not
signicantly) than in the United States.
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Uij;t =
1
  (1   )1  c
 
i;td
1  
i;t  

eemi;t
2
2ai
  t 1
2

 ft    t
2
(17)
where di;t denotes the standard nal consumption and  2 [0; 1] represents
the importance of cultural goods in consumption. Assuming for simplicity
a transformation technology from one standard good to one cultural good,
it entails that both forms of consumption which maximize (17) are charac-
terized by:
ci;t =  [(1   t) yij;t +  tyt] (18)
di;t = (1   ) [(1   t) yij;t +  tyt] (19)
When introducing the optimal behaviors (18) and (19) into the utility
function (17), the latter becomes Uij;t = yij;t (1   t) +  tyt   (e
em
i;t )
2
2ai
. In
this conguration, the utility maximization considering (16) leads to an
unchanged level of extrinsically motivated e¤ort compared to the previous
sections, and it follows that eit = ai (2   t).
Consider now that the concept of fair income is associated with the
principle of equal opportunities between individuals. In this case we can
redene the fair level of income as:
y^ij;t = ct 1 + ei;t (20)
where ct 1 is the average cultural consumption. In line with Bowles and
Gintis (2002), we assume that personal cognitive skills characterized by ai
are not heritable genetic traits. It entails in particular that the parental
cultural consumption cj;t 1 of an individual ij is not correlated with his
cognitive skills ai. The fair level of taxation stays then similar to (15), i.e.
 ft = 1 
q
1  Lt2 if Lt  2 (= 1 otherwise), except that:
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Lt =
2ct 1
2a
(21)
where 2ct 1 is the variance of parentscultural consumption in t  1. Indi-
vidual demands for redistribution are then as follows:
 ij;t = t 1
s
ij;t +
 
1  t 1

 ft (22)
where  sij;t =
2(a ai)+(t 1 j;t 1)
2a amed , and t 1 =
2a amed
2a amed+ 1
'0+'1[ft 1 t 1]
2
.
Compared with eq. (5), eq. (22) still stresses that individual demands for
redistribution depend on the income inequality, the perceived unfairness of
the income distribution and the specic history of the society. In addition,
it stresses the importance of the family background: everything else being
equal, an individual raised in a wealthy family (with high cultural standards)
tends to support less redistribution. Following eq. (22), the tax rate chosen
under the majority rule is then:
 t = t 1
s
t +
 
1  t 1

 ft (23)
where  st =
2(a amed)+(t 1 med;t 1)
2a amed .
Consider an institutional stationary history so that k =  1;8k  t 1.
In this case we have (see Appendix C):
 st =  
s ( 1) (24)
 ft =  
f ( 1) (25)
where  s ( 1) =

2+
 (1  1)(2  1)
1  (1  1)

(a amed)
2a amed and  
f ( 1) = 1 
r
1   2(1  1)2(2  1)2
2[1  2(1  1)2] .
From (24) and (25) we can dene a purely fair and a purely interested tax
rates corresponding respectively to  f =  f
 
 f

and  s =  s ( s). It re-
sults two continuous and monotonic functions  f ( ) and  s ( ;) so that
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Figure 3: Multiple steady states and family background (ln (a) 
N (0; 0:217),  = 0:5, '0 = 0:07, '1 = 200)
df
d  0, where  f (0) = 0 and  f (1) =
p
2  1  0:41, @s@  0 and @
s
@  0,
where  s (0;) =  s (1) = 2(a amed)2a amed and 
s ( ; 0) = 0.
Proposition 3 Considering a stationnary tax history fk =  1gk=t 1k= 1, it
exists ~'0  0 and ~  0:55 so that if '0  ~'0 and   ~ ,  f ( )  
 s ( ;) 
q
4
(2a amed)'1 is a su¢ cient condition so that the model exhibits
two local steady states characterized by  s ( ;) < US < EU   f ( ),
where  f ( )   =  f () and  s ( ;)   =  s () (see Fig 3).
The mechanism of cultural transmission we have characterized in the
second section is then robust to di¤erent specications of income determi-
nation in exhibiting a multiplicity of steady states. As explained in the
second section, if '0 is too high the only steady state is a low redistribution
American-style system. By contrast, if '1 is low enough, the only steady
state is a high redistribution European-style system. In addition, as the
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engine of unfairness in this conguration is the cultural consumption, un-
fairness is all the more important as  is high. The sensitivity of the tax
rate percieved as fair with respect to the e¤ective tax rate is then increased
with  , and if  > ~ it follows that
 @ f@ 1  1=f ( ) > 1. As EU   f ( )
if '0  0, it follows that if  > ~ the high redistribution European-style
system may not be a steady state.
5 Conclusion
Under the assumption that humans are only driven by their self-interest,
Meltzer and Richard (1981) show that the level of redistribution in a de-
mocratic society increases with the inequality in the income distribution.
However, this result is weakly supported by the data. In this article, we
argue that this failure of the canonical model can be associated with its be-
havioral assumption. Firstly, surveys clearly show that individuals do care
about fairness in their demand for redistribution. Secondly, they show that
the cultural environment in which individuals grow up a¤ects their prefer-
ences about redistribution. In order to characterize the individual demands
for redistribution, we then propose a mechanism of cultural transmission
of the taste for fairness. Consistently with the process of socialization, the
young preferences depend on collective choices through observation and imi-
tation. Observation during childhood of redistributive policies far from what
is perceived as fair results then in a lower taste for fairness. As a conse-
quence, we show that the model exhibits a multiplicity of history-dependent
steady states which may account for the huge di¤erence of redistribution
observed between Europe and the United States.
The approach we use in this article raises two issues which can lead
to further research. First, we have not considered individual heterogeneity
in the taste for fairness. However, following Alesina and Giuliano (2010), it
appears that more educated individuals are less supportive of redistribution.
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Second, we have assumed that all individuals were sharing the same ideal of
fairness. Most individuals certainly perceive earnings related to e¤ort as fair
and earnings related to luck as unfair. However, as experimentally shown
by Cappelen et al. (2007), a signicant proportion of individuals argue that
individuals should not be held responsible for their e¤ort and talent. These
individuals consider then equal sharing as the fair outcome.
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Appendix A. Proof of Propositions
Proposition 1
Let us dene t =  f  t the di¤erence between the fair and the e¤ective
level of taxation at date t, eq. (8) can be rewritten as:
t =
2a  amed
2a  amed + 1'0+'12t 1

 f    s

(26)
and stationnarity is then dened by:
3  

 f    s

2 +
1 + (2a  amed)'0
(2a  amed)'1
  

 f    s
 '0
'1
= 0 (27)
By the Cardanos formula, eq. (27) exhibits two or three real roots if
  0, where:
 =
 1
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
1 + (2a  amed)'0
(2a  amed)'1
2 
 f    s
2   41 + (2a  amed)'0
(2a  amed)'1

+
 
 f    s2
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'0
'1

4

 f    s
2   18  9 (2a  amed)'0
(2a  amed)'1

If assuming
 
 f    s2   4(2a amed)'1  0, as lim'0=0  0 and lim'0=1 > 0,
it exists '^0  0 so that if '0  '^0 eq. (27) exhibits two or three real roots.
In addition, as 2a amed
2a amed+ 1'0
 
 f    s  0 and @
"
2a amed
2a amed+ 1'0+'12
(f s)
#
@2

0, if
 
 f    s2  4(2a amed)'1  0 and '0  '^0, the model exhibits two steady
states.
Proposition 2
As far as  f    s  2
q

2a amed , the American style system is character-
ized by the following payroll tax:
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US =
1
2
 
 f +  s  
r
( f    s)2   2
s

!
We have then:
@US
@
=
1
2
0@@ f
@
+
@ s
@
 
2
 
 f    s @f@   @s@   2 @s@ + 2 s
2
q
( f    s)2   2s
1A (28)
=
1
2
0@1   f    sq
( f    s)2   2s
1A @ f
@
+
1
2
@ s
@
+
 
 f    s @s@ +  @s@    sq
( f    s)2   2s
where @
f
@  0 and @
s
@  0.
From (28), we deduce that a su¢ cient condition such that @
US
@  0 is:

 f    s
 @ s
@
+


 s


@ s
@

 s
  1

 0 (29)
Obviously, if "s =
@s
@

s  1 condition (29) always holds and then
@US
@  0.
If "
s
 < 1, we can deduce from 
f    s  2
q

2a amed ,

 
(f s)2
2s
that
 
 f    s @s@+(f s)22s s  "s   1  0)   f    s @s@+ s  "s   1 
0. We can therefore show that condition (29) is satised when

2 + 
f s
s

"
s
 
f s
s , "
s
  
f s
f+s
:
Proposition 3
As for proposition 1, let us dene t = 
f
t    t the di¤erence between
the fair and the e¤ective level of taxation, eq (23) can be rewritten as:
t =
2a  amed
2a  amed + 1'0+'12t 1

 ft    st

(30)
Stationnarity can still be expressed as in eq. (27), i.e. 3   f    s 2+
1+(2a amed)'0
(2a amed)'1   
 
 f    s '0'1 = 0. Denoting  a root of equation (30),
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where  =  f ()   , if   f ()   s ()2   4(2a amed)'1 > 0 8, as
lim
'0=0
< 0 and lim
'0=1
> 0, it exists ~'0 > 0 so that if '0  ~'0 (30) exhibits
three real roots .
As @ 
f
@  0 and @ 
s
@  0, knowing from (23) that  2

 s ( ;) ;  f ( )

,
it entails that  s ()   s ( ;) and  f ()   f ( ), and then that:
 f ( )  s ( ;)  2
r

2a  amed =) 
f ()  s ()  2
r

2a  amed 8

where  f ( )   =  f () and  s ( ;)   =  s ().
Considering that EU = sup fg, by denition in '0 = ~'0 @

t
@ 1

 1=EU
=
1. Besides, in '0 = 0 
EU =  f ( ), and then @

t
@ 1

 1=EU
= @ 
f
@ 1

 1=f ( )
.
From (32) we can verify that
 @ f@ 1  1=f (0) = 0 whereas
 @ f@ 1  1=f (1) =
(3 
p
2)
h
1+(2 
p
2)

2 (2 
p
2)
2
i
2
h
1 (2 
p
2)
2
i2  3:6. It exists then ~ 2 ]0; 1[ so that   ~ 
entails
 @ f@ 1  1=f ( )  1. From (32) and (33) we can then compute
~  0:55 (see Fig. 4). By monotonicity, it follows that
 @t@ 1  1=EU  1
8'0  ~'0 and 8  ~ .
At last, considering that US = inf fg, @t@ 1

 1=US
can be either pos-
itive or negative. If @

t
@ 1

 1=US
 0, knowing from (23) that t j 1=0 > 0,
by denition @

t
@ 1

 1=US
 1 if  f ( )   s ( ;) 
q
4
(2a amed)'1 .
If @

t
@ 1

 1=US
 0, we can deduce from (23) and (24) that
 @t@ 1  1=US  @ s@ 1  1=US . In addition, as @2 s@2 1 = [1  (1  1)]2+ [1+(1  1)(2  (1  1))][1  (1  1)]3   s (1) 
0,
 @ s@ 1  1=US 
 @ s@ 1  1=0 where
 @ s@ 1  1=0 =  3  2(1  )2 s (1). As
@ s
@ 1  0 (see Appendix C),  f ( )    s ( ;)  2
q

2a amed implies in
particular that  s (1)   f ( ) 8 . It follows that sup
 ~ 
 @ s@ 1  1=0

n
 3  
2(1  )2 
f ( )
o
 =~ 
 0:7, where  f

~ 

 0:21, and then that   ~ if
@t
@ 1

 1=US
 0 implies
 @t@ 1  1=US < 1.
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It follows that, considering a stationnary tax history fk =  1gk=t 1k= 1,
 f ( )    s ( ;)  2
q

2a amed 8  ~ < 1 is a su¢ cient condition so
that the model exhibits two local steady states characterized by  s ( ;) <
US < EU   f ( ).
Appendix B. The fair-oriented cognitive process
The moral objective is characterized by
Ft =
Z
i
f[(1   t) yit +  yt]  y^itg2 di
According to eq. (4),
Ft =
Z
i
f[(1   t) (ai (1   t) + "i) +  ta (2   t)]  ai (2   t)g2 di
=
Z
i
f(1   t) "i    t (1   t) (ai   a)g2 di:
As a and " are independently distributed over the population,
Ft = (1   t)2
Z
i
"2i di+
2
t (1   t)2
Z
i
(ai   a)2 di = (1   t)2 2"+2t (1   t)2 2a:
It follows that:
Ft
2a
= (1   t)2
 
L+ 2

where L = 
2
"
2
.
Consider now intrinsic motivation. According to eq. (14),
Ft =
Z
i
f[(1   t) (ai (2   t) + "i) +  ta (2   t)]  ai (2   t)g2 di
=
Z
i
f(1   t) "i    t (2   t) (ai   a)g2 di
= (1   t)2
Z
i
"2i di+
2
t (2   t)2
Z
i
(ai   a)2 di = (1   t)2 2"+2t (2   t)2 2a:
It follows that:
Ft
2a
= (1   t)2 L+ 2 (2   t)2
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Minimizing Ft in that case yields
@
Ft
2a
@ t
= 4 (1   t)
 2t + 2 t   L2  and
@2
Ft
2a
@2t
=  4  2t + 2 t   L2 + 8 (1   t)2.
If L > 2,  2t + 2 t   L2 < 0 8 t  1. It follows that
@
Ft
2a
@ t
(1) = 0,
@2
Ft
2a
@2t
(1) > 0 and then argmin
 t1;L>2
Ft = 1.
If L  2,  2t + 2 t   L2 =  

1 
q
1  L2    t

1 +
q
1  L2    t

.
It follows that
@
Ft
2a
@ t
(1) = 0,
@2
Ft
2a
@2t
(1)  0 while
@
Ft
2a
@ t

1 
q
1  L2

= 0,
@2
Ft
2a
@2t

1 
q
1  L2

 0 and then argmin
 t1;L2
Ft = 1 
q
1  L2 .
Appendix C. Family background with stationary
history
From (16), (19) and (13) we have:
ci;t =  f(1   t) [cj;t 1 + (2   t) ai] +  t [ct 1 + (2   t) a]g (31)
Assuming that o¤springscognitive skills are randomly determined, in-
dependently of their parentscognitive skills, entails also they are not cor-
related with their parentscultural consumption. In such a case, when con-
sidering an institutional stationary history so that  s =  1;8s  t 1, it fol-
lows from (31) that 2ct 1 = 
2
c ( 1) =  
2 (1   1)2
h
2c ( 1) + (2   t 1)2 2a
i
,
or equivalently:
2c ( 1) =
 2 (1   1)2 (2   1)2
1   2 (1   1)2
2a
and then following (11) and (21) that:
 ft =  
f ( 1) = 1 
vuut1   2 (1   1)2 (2   1)2
2
h
1   2 (1   1)2
i
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It follows that:
@ f
@ 1
=  
 2 (1   1) (2   1)
h
1 + (1   1)

2   2 (1   1)2
i
2

1   ft
 h
1   2 (1   1)2
i2  0(32)
@ f
@ 2
=
(1   1)2 (2   1)2
4

1   ft
 h
1   2 (1   1)2
i2  0
Verifying in addition that lim
=0

    f () =  1+rsup1  2 2
1  2 ; 0


0 and lim
=1

    f () = 1, we can derive that  f ( )   =  f () is a
monotonic and continuous function so that d
f
d  0,  f (0) = 0 and  f (1) =p
2   1  0:41 (see Fig. 4). We can also verify that solving  =  f () is
equivalent to solving 3 

3 + 2
 2

 +2 = 0. Using the Cardanos formula,
the general specication of  f ( ) is under its trigonometric form as follows:
 f ( ) = 2
s
1 +
2
3 2
cos
2641
3
arccos
0B@ vuut 27
3 + 2
 2
3
1CA+ 4
3

375 (33)
From (31) we also have
t 1 =  ( 1) =  1  (1  1) f(1   1) (2   1) a+  1 [ ( 1) + (2   1) a]g
and
medt 1 = med ( 1) =  1  (1  1) f(1   1) (2   1) amed +  1 [ ( 1) + (2   1) a]g.
It follows that:
t 1   med;t 1 =  ( 1)  med ( 1) =  (1   1) (2   1)
1   (1   1) (a  amed)
and therefore:
 st =
2 (a  amed) + (t 1   med;t 1)
2a  amed =  
s ( 1) =
h
2 +  (1  1)(2  1)1  (1  1)
i
(a  amed)
2a  amed
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Figure 4: Characteristics of  f ( )   =  f ()
It follows that
@ s
@ 1
=  1 + (1   1) [2   (1   1)]
2 [1   (1   1)]2
  s (1)  0
@ s
@ 
=
(1   1) (2   1)
2 [1   (1   1)]2
 s (1)  0
@ s
@
=

1 +
 (1   1) (2   1)
2 [1   (1   1)]

@ 2(a amed)2a amed
@
 0
and it results a continuous and monotonic function  s ( ;) so that @
s
@  0
and @
s
@  0, dened by:
 s ( ;) =
q
[(1   ) a+ (a  amed)]2 +  a2 (a  amed)  [(1   ) a+ (a  amed)]
2 a
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